Publication date:  12 January 2001

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Vladimir Putin's public policy has been lately producing a double impression upon observers. On the one hand, one could not but acknowledge professionalism of the RF President's team. Not only the carriage of Mr. Putin was erect. He also spoke fluently and pithily, tried not to reveal his personal position on this or that social problem without absolute necessity, acted in compliance with the expectations he arose among Russians while in the capacity of the Prime Minister. In other words, Putin maintained his reputation.

But perfection in any form is oppressing. Even one who honestly makes one's bread with political journalism can't but start one day to suspect Mr. Perfection, The Man Who Makes No Mistakes, the political machine that sells specially packed perfection. One day you find it impossible to understand, whether you've gone mad, whether everything has turned upside down or whether secret forces of the offstage Russia are implementing their malicious plans, civil institutions being fully inactive... An honest man starts to explore himself for strains of court toadies - and finds them.

This December was a turning point in respect of the attitude of Russian mass media to Putin's activity. Izvestia reviewer Maxim Sokolov, who in a sense is worth all other Russian political journalists taken together, published a number of texts in which he expressed views distinctly different from his earlier ones while analyzing possible consequences of the Russian President's latest activities.

I think, something like that had to happen in this October or November. However, accident with the "Kursk" nuclear submarine and the "information war" that followed warded off the blow that was aimed at the President: the conduct of his opponents was unbecoming.

Today the situation is different. One may pretend of course that nothing has happened: an article was published in a national newspaper, so what? But the authority of Maxim Sokolov makes one take his arguments seriously and consider them a disturbing indication of the state of public opinion. As for Sokolov's political intuition... In November 1995 (!) Maxim Sokolov publicly supported Boris Yeltsin as a presidential contender. At that time his position looked like dangerous and idle eccentricity of a tardy radical. However, the Russian society agreed with Maxim in half a year. But Putin is not Yeltsin, 2001 is not 1996. That's why there would be no good if public opinion transformed in a while into what we once had.

After all, it's not the personality of Putin that matters. The overwhelming majority of Russians are not his relatives and don't care about his personal qualities. For the majority of conscientious voters, the number of which I guess is somewhat more than is supposed, the President is first of all not a man but an embodiment of the tendency, perhaps the only productive political tendency in Russia today. In this sense the critical analysis of Putin's activity undertaken in December is not a matter of personal attitude to the President but of broad discussion. At least it has to become the one, provided that we are really aiming at political adequacy.

My respected opponent M.Sokolov criticizes the President for his caution, which in his opinion should be equated with indecisiveness. He says, drawing of a centerline, which seems to be so dear to the heart of any Russian, contradicts the essential needs of the state, which requires a consistent, definite and plain policy.

I'm not going to defend Putin. Neither do I share Sokolov's opinion. I beg to take a detached view of the arguments of both parties in order to grasp their real meaning, i.e. the essence of the ongoing political process.

Putin made a name for himself performing as two or three different persons simultaneously. The image of a resolute politician suppressing separatists supplemented the image of a successful courtier, a cunning and nimble man who chooses the policy depending on circumstances. The image of a fencer, both resolute and irresolute, who waits patiently till the time comes to make a decisive prick, was one of the chief factors that drew to him sympathies of the society. He seemed to be one of those Russians who "harness slowly but ride quickly". Nothing changed in this relation within a year and a half. However, at that time we were firmly convinced that we were not moving, that we were making no headway. And now we can't understand if we are on the way or still harnessing our horse.

Perhaps only God and Alexander Voloshin know the exact answer. But still something tells us we are moving forward.

We cannot understand why the bill on national symbols has been passed also because we recently got used to identify every political decision with the effort it takes to approve it. From the democratic point of view, the approval of the new anthem is a bad sign: it is either a manifestation of Mr. Putin's intimate inclination to not quite remote past or, which is even worse, an indication of his diffidence. Putin, who seemingly has a strong backing, neglects his strength and makes a dubious courtsy to leftists, who are just not able to compromise.

But maybe we shouldn't seek for political implications but admit imperfection of our traditional logic and understanding instead? The seeming defects may well represent some intentions that are presently not revealed but are going to be realized. If it's really so, our horses haven't yet moved out and things are right where they started.

In the beginning of 2000 the Kremlin seemed to yield to the pressure of the Otechestvo - Vsya Rossiya (All Russia Is the Homeland) block and Petersburg Mayor Yakovlev. Candidate to the high post of the Petersburg Mayor Valentina Matvienko, who was supported by Moscow, suddenly withdrew her candidature during the campaign. At that time many people said and wrote that the President decided not to engage in the struggle. When the institution of presidential representatives in Russian federal districts was established, they fell silent.

Perhaps the affair with the national symbols is also needed for achieving a certain goal, which we fail to understand yet. One can only suppose today what this goal really is, for the indications are quite vague.

Actually, only two players remain on Russia's political stage today: the Power and the Leftist Voter. The power apparently decided to carry a dialogue with the leftist voter. Considering apparent ideological weakness of the left, the slogans of which were adroitly taken over by the new administration, a sound leftist party and a new leftist elite can appear. Leftist parliamentarians haven't definitely reacted to the President's initiatives so far, and that means that the dialogue with the leftist voter has been established successfully, at least in the tactical respect.

What looks like a process of drawing a centerline, what seems to be a search of a dubious compromise, - isn't it really an evidence of emergence of a new aggressive policy, the goal of which is to destroy the indeterminate quasiparty system that developed in the late ten years?

The evidence we have at our disposal doesn't allow us to reject this supposition.

• This article in Russian

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