Publication date:  30 August 2002

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Of all "small" nations of East Asia, Korea was traditionally more close to China than the others. Japan (which was undoubtedly nothing more but one of the "small" nations until the end of the 19th century) always emphasized its specific character and in many ways, including its attitude towards monarchy and its notion of legitimacy of a ruling dynasty, was not an orthodox Confucian nation. Vietnam always saw China as a potential aggressor and a "probable adversary," despite the enormous cultural influence of its great northern neighbor. As for Korea, its people always respected Chinese classic literature and maintained good relations with China.

No wonder that Koreans accepted the Chinese Confucian concept of the "Heavenly mandate" without any doubt or reservation.

From 1392, the ruling dynasty in Korea was the Choson dynasty, which is often called in the Western literature the Yi dynasty after the name of its ruling clan. This dynasty was founded by the fortunate warlord Yi Sung Gye, who seized political and military power in 1389 and overthrew the ruling Koryo dynasty. The last Koryo ruler and his closest kinsmen were sent into exile and secretly murdered. However, the overwhelming majority of the Wang family, from where the ruling clan of the Koryo dynasty came, didn't suffer at all and became common subjects of the new power. Just as their predecessors, Yi monarchs called themselves "kings" (Wangs), and this title implied their dependence on the Emperor (Di or Huangdi). According to the Confucian worldview, there could be only one Emperor in the Universe, and that was the one who ruled in China. All the other rulers were vassals of the Emperor. They were to pay him a symbolic tribute and get his approval when ascending their thrones. Korea subscribed to these ideas, and each new Korean king was approved in Beijing. This was, however, a formal approval, just a ritual act, and the Chinese court responded to the tributes sent to Beijing with "grants" of approximately the same value.

The Yi dynasty broke the record of retaining the throne in the Confucian world. It ruled the country up to 1910, that is, for 518 years - longer than any other dynasty in the region. Strictly speaking, the Japanese imperial dynasty retained power for a notably longer period of time, but it cannot be considered a Confucian monarchy in the proper sense of the term, for it adhered to quite a different ideology of power. Korean politicians and thinkers were well aware that in this sense their dynasty was unique. In 1692 Koreans celebrated the 300th anniversary of their dynasty with a certain sense of anxiety, since both Chinese and earlier Korean dynasties usually ruled for some 300 years. Many anticipated different kinds of troubles on this fateful date. However, no noticeable problems followed. Up to the end of the 19th century, exceptional peace and stability reigned in the country. It was not an inland crisis but a foreign invasion that eventually ruined the Yi dynasty.

From the end of the 19th century, the Japanese influence on the peninsula began to grow. Having gained victory in the Russian-Japanese war, the Japanese government virtually annexed Korea, and the formal annexation took place in 1910. In 1905, King Kojong, the 26th Wang of the Yi dynasty, who ascended the throne as a very young man in 1863, was on the Korean throne. In 1907, Kojong had to abdicate after trying to enlist international support for independence of Korea. His unsuccessful secret diplomacy provoked anger of the Japanese authorities. As a result, his heir Sunjong ascended the throne. It was Sunjong who had the dubious advantage of signing the treaty that proclaimed surrender of Korea's independence. Thus Korea formally became a Japanese colony.

After the abdication of the Yi dynasty, its members retained in possession some royal palaces in the center of Seoul. Their formal privileges were the same as those of younger members of the Japanese imperial family. In addition, the colonial authorities began paying them quite a fair allowance, which allowed the ex-royal clan continue keeping large palace personnel and live at a high rate. What accounted for such generosity was both monarchic solidarity and political arithmetic. The overthrown dynasty retained a strong influence among Confucian traditionalists, who continued playing a substantial role in the anti-Japanese resistance movement and had a significant influence in the society. That's why the colonial authorities tried to achieve understanding with the overthrown rulers and thereby prevent their active involvement in the anti-colonial war. On the whole, this policy was successful. Yet, both kings didn't turn fully into collaborationists, and as a result, remained important symbols of the Korean national self-consciousness for quite a long time. When Kojong died in 1919, his funeral turned into a mass anti-Japanese demonstration, which marked the beginning of the so-called "March 1 uprising," the largest anti-Japanese action of the entire colonial period. The death of Kojong's son Sunjong in 1926 also provoked riots and demonstrations, though on a lesser scale.

But already by the early 1920's the number of monarchists among participants of the anti-colonial movement became comparatively small. The old Confucian ideology had been hopelessly compromised in the eyes of young Koreans, and its adherents were gradually getting older and dying out. It were pro-Western liberals, graduates of missionary schools, or socialists and communists who began playing the major part in the anti-colonial movement. All of them were resolute republicans and treated monarchy as an archaic, outdated institution.

After the death of both monarchs members of their families, including their wives, numerous concubines and children, continued living in the palace. In 1907, Yi Un, the ten-year-old son of Kojong and one of his concubines, was proclaimed heir to the Korean throne. In the same year he was deported to Tokyo by the Japanese authorities. There Yi Un was brought up together with the members of the Japanese imperial family. He graduated from the military school and became officer of the imperial army, in which he rose to the rank of lieutenant general by 1945. Wishing to attach him even closer to Japan, the Japanese government married him to a girl from the ruling imperial clan, princess Masako.

After 1945, Yi Un made numerous attempts to return to Korea, but the government of Rhee Syngman always rejected his requests. Rhee Syngman, who was ambitious for power and suspicious, might just have been afraid of a potential rival. It was only in 1963, after the overthrow of Rhee Syngman, that Yi Un, Masako and their son Yi Ku managed to get back to Seoul. When their plane was about to land in Seoul, Yi Un got an insult to the brain, from which he never fully recovered. Yi Un, the last officially proclaimed heir to the Korean throne, died in 1970 and was honorably buried in the ancestral graveyard.

Ti Ku, son of Yi Un and Masako (born in 1930), who is now head of the ex-royal family, graduated from the prestigious Massachusetts Institute of Technology and worked in New York for some time. Having married an American, Yi Ku became an American citizen. In 1963 he came to Seoul with his parents and started working as a civil engineer. For some time he headed a small construction company, which eventually went bankrupt. He still lives in Korea, occasionally taking part in clan ceremonies.

Any monarchy restoration movement is out of the question in today's Korea. From the standpoint of Confucian traditionalists, the Yi dynasty lost its "Heavenly mandate" as soon as it lost power. That's why its restoration is not only useless but also contradicts the distinctly expressed will of the Higher Forces. And there are no other pretenders to the throne. Today there are absolutely no organizations in South Korea that would see restoration of monarchy as their ultimate goal. For the overwhelming majority of Koreans, monarchy is something archaic and exotic, and the very thought of its restoration provokes laughter.

Translated from Russian by Igor Pospekhin

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